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Power as Control and the Therapeutic Effects
of Hegel’s Logic
Christopher Yeomans
Rather than approaching the question of the constructive or therapeutic
character of Hegel’s Logic through a global consideration of its argument and its
relation to the rest of Hegel’s system, I want to come at the question by
considering a specific thread that runs through the argument of the Logic, namely
the question of the proper understanding of power or control. What I want to try
to show is that there is a close connection between therapeutic and constructive
elements in Hegel’s treatment of power. To do so I will make use of two deep
criticisms of Hegel’s treatment from Michael Theunissen. First comes
Theunissen’s claim that in Hegel’s logical scheme, reality is necessarily dominated
by the concept rather than truly reciprocally related to it. Then I will consider
Theunissen’s structurally analogous claim that for Hegel, the power of the
concept is the management of the suppression of the other. Both of these claims
are essentially claims about the way in which elements of the logic of reflection
are modified and yet continue to play a role in the logic of the concept.
The Hegelian response to these criticisms must draw on two quite clearly
constructive elements in Hegel’s Logic — i.e., elements in which Hegel argues for
specific conceptions of traditional philosophical concepts. The first is Hegel’s
claim in his discussion of teleology that the immanence of the end in the means
entails the reciprocal transformation of ends and means, and thus a mutability of
the end as well as the means and the realization it produces. The second is his
claim that the structure of the concept provides a more significant role for
contingent particularity than does the model of necessary activity in the Doctrine
of Essence.
But the point here is not primarily to keep score; rather I want to show how
this constructive response has a therapeutic function in revealing the significance
of certain expectations about power within Theunissen’s criticisms, assumptions
which are widely shared and whose initial plausibility accounts for the force of
those criticisms. Specifically, Theunissen’s argument for his first claim — that
reality is dominated by the concept — turns out to depend on the assumption
that the concept must serve as a fixed goal in order for its interaction with reality
to be productive. Theunissen’s argument for his second claim — that the power
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of the concept is the management of the suppression of the other— turns out to
depend on the idea that power requires the overcoming of alterity and thus a
repression of difference. Though these are related points, they address two
importantly different aspects of the notion of power as control: the first concerns
the aspect of guidance that distinguishes power in this sense from blind force
(e.g., EL§§147Z, 136R); and the second concerns the aspect of effectiveness that
distinguishes power from mere activity. The two aspects are internally related, of
course: guidance aims at being effective and effectiveness is a success term
measured by a goal. But as Theunissen’s different arguments show, these aspects
raise different concerns for the notion of power that are best dealt with
separately.
Thus I hope that tracing a dialogue between Theunissen and Hegel on these
points can serve a double purpose: to reveal subtleties in Hegel’s understanding
of power; and to show how the constructive and the therapeutic are joined in
Hegel’s Logic insofar as his argument attempts to reveal these common
expectations about power as misunderstandings precisely by offering an
alternative reconstruction of that notion.
I
In ‘Begriff und Realität’, Theunissen focuses on Hegel’s understanding of the
truth of finite objects.1 After noting that Hegel’s phenomenological conception of
truth requires that the truth of the object come to light only with the revelation of
the untruth of our initial take on the object, Theunissen notes that this tension
within consciousness is grounded in a tension within the object itself. Finite
things both do and do not correspond to their concepts, and a fortiori to the
concept itself.2 But Theunissen holds that Hegel never clearly distinguished two
senses of correspondence: as process and as result. As an uncompleted process
the dialogue between concept and reality can be truly reciprocal, but the goal of
the completion of the dialectical disclosure of the truth of reality requires the
concept to remain immune from the influence of reality.3 And this is true, on
Theunissen’s view, because only under the condition that the concept is a fixed
goal can reality move towards it and become adequate to it. Thus, despite the fact
that Hegel’s notion of truth puts the concept and the reality of the object into an
apparent dialogue, in fact reality can only comply with the concept, rather than
the two cooperating with each other. As a result, though Hegel initially uses the
symmetrical notion of a correspondence (Entsprechung) between concept and reality
to articulate the notion of truth, he ends up with an asymmetrical notion of the
overlapping (Übergreiffen) of reality by the concept. In this relation, whatever motility
there is in the concept itself is not a matter of it, too, standing under the claim of
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reality and opening itself up to it, but rather a result of the resistance reality
provides to the concept’s attempt to manipulate it under the claim of its own
authority. As a result, the finite thing (and thus the finite subject as well) can only
be subsumed under the concept rather than transforming itself to become the
proper reality of the concept. So though Hegel does not share Plato’s complete
denigration of the finite as untrue, his contrary attribution of a correspondence
between the concept and reality of the finite is insufficient to do justice to the
finitude of either subjects or objects.
There is much to be said for Theunissen’s line of argument here. If the
conclusion were true that the finite thing can only be subsumed under the
concept rather than being its expression, this would undermine many of Hegel’s
most cherished positions, including essential elements of his practical philosophy
and his self-understanding of his difference from Kant.
But for his part Hegel rejects the assumption that an end must be fixed in
order to provide a controlling orientation. In fact, the need to overcome
an intentional conception of teleology according to which a fixed, subjective
purpose is merely translated into objectivity is a central theme in Hegel’s
discussion of teleology, and in that overcoming both the subjectivity and the fixity
of the purpose must be given up. Thus Hegel holds that what initially appears
as a relation in which only the object is transformed is soon bent back on
the subject:
Purpose is in [objective being] the impulse to its realization; the
determinateness of the moments of the concept is externality;
the simplicity of these moments within the unity of the concept
is however incommensurable with what this unity is, and the
concept therefore repels itself from itself. This repulsion
[Abstoßen] is in general the resolution (Entschluß – perhaps
‘unclosing’ (cf. PR§12R)) of the self-reference of the negative
unity by virtue of which the latter is exclusive (ausschliessende)
individuality; but by this excluding (Ausschliessen) the unity
resolves itself, that is to say, it discloses [or unlocks] itself
(entschließt sie sich oder schließt sich auf). (WL 12, 162)
In this self-repulsion, the concept gains its particular content and thus changes its
nature as it discloses itself objectively. This is why Hegel immediately goes on to
claim that the means is superior to the finite (subjective) end as an understanding
of purposiveness, and serves as the mediating middle term between that end and
external reality (WL 12, 166).
We can understand this constructive suggestion in two ways, one more
intuitive than the other. To begin with, consider the example of practical
reasoning. One of the difficulties of views such as Hegel’s that invoke social roles
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or collective identities as essential determinants of practical reasoning is that it
appears not to leave any stable critical standpoint from which such roles or
identities can be assessed. But as Anthony Laden nicely puts it, ‘The requirement
of stability [of an evaluative standpoint] does not require absolute fixity, but
rather something more akin to inertia.’4 So more generally, we might think of
the orienting function of the concept qua end as requiring only such relative
resistance to change; or to use another metaphor, we might think of the concept
as the wheel that moves more slowly in the mechanism as compared with the
quickly turning wheels of the particular circumstances of its realization. This is
not yet Hegel’s constructive solution in its full glory, but it begins to reveal its
therapeutic effects: to show that fixity as such is not required to play the role of
orientation to which appeal is made in justifying that fixity.
We can go deeper into the constructive suggestion by noting that the inertia
metaphor might lead one to think this is just a matter of the push-back
or Gegenstoß of reality against the concept that Theunissen rightly rejects as
inadequate, but Hegel’s notion of self-repulsion hints at a more striking
conception. First, note that the inertia here is on the side of the concept, so if
anything it represents the concept pushing back against the influence of reality,
which influence is therefore acknowledged as a form of power in its own right.
Second, recall Hegel’s view that the greatest realization of the end is the means
rather than the state of affairs produced by its use. In one of his more revealing
analogies, Hegel holds that the concept or end is related to objective reality as a
purpose is related to the techniques for its realization (WL12, 160). This
conception, still from the discussion of subjective (or intentional) purpose,
provides some insight into the way that the asymmetry Hegel sees between
concepts and reality is nonetheless compatible with the kind of dialogical
reciprocity Theunessen thinks Hegel’s conception excludes. Interestingly, the
asymmetry is not fundamentally one of constancy or stability. Just as many
techniques may be used to fulfill the same purpose, many purposes may be
served by the same technique. And one can make a change or development of
technique one’s purpose as opposed to taking techniques to be given resources.
The completed result of an identification of purpose and technique — for
example, in the career of an athlete — is just the full development of the
sensitivity of each to the other in their ongoing transformation. But this
sensitivity is globally a result or achievement as much as it is locally a process.
When interpreted along these lines, Hegel’s conception is not so much subject to
Theunissen’s charge of ambiguity in the face of the process/result distinction as it
is a use of the internal connection between process and result to bring out the
deeper structure of the telic relation between concept and object.
Of course, Theunissen is right to note the asymmetry between concept and
reality in Hegel’s understanding of their relation. There is no escaping Hegel’s
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priority of the concept in that relation, but no general problem for the
valorization of finitude is entailed by this priority when it is properly understood.
To stick with the current analogy, it is not the case that the technique is subject to
the standard of the purpose, but not vice versa. For certain techniques (e.g., of
musical performance) demand certain ends of their practitioners (e.g., of the
development of specific physical abilities), and we may criticize an unrealizable
end as incompatible with prevailing technique. Rather, the asymmetry is higher-
order and more theoretical: the concept provides the resources — through the
terms of universality, particularity, and individuality — of articulating the
reciprocal relation in which it stands to reality, whereas objectivist theories of that
reality cannot. This is, of course, precisely the point of criticizing the Myth of
Given, and Hegel’s response is certainly to advocate ‘the unboundedness of the
conceptual’, in John McDowell’s phrase.5 But it must be noted specifically that
particularity is the conceptual description for the way that the concept stands
under the claim of reality and opens itself up to it, and thus the way that it is
unbounded without being ‘frictionless spinning in the void’. This is why, in the
idea, universality is associated with the concept, particularity with actuality or
reality, and individuality with the idea itself. This is a way of talking about the
unboundedness of the conceptual in a way that is independent of talk of
cognitive capacities, i.e., that clearly separates the distinction between activity and
passivity from that between spontaneity and receptivity, to use a distinction
Robert Pippin has made in responding to McDowell.6 To come back to
Theunissen’s way of framing things, in this case the asymmetry involved is
compatible with dialogue or communicative freedom, and is somewhat like the
dialogue between teachers and students. Though teachers do learn from students
and need to be responsive to their pedagogical needs, the teachers are more
responsible than students for setting the terms of the relation in which such
reciprocal dialogue is made possible. But if the point about particularity holds,
then the conceptual-subjective vocabulary itself can explain this point, and
intersubjective dialogue then just becomes an important example of Hegel’s
point rather than the necessary vocabulary for articulating its significance —
more on this in section II.
This view of the asymmetry explains how Hegel’s models of Entsprechen
(correspondence) and Übergreifen (overlapping) are compatible. The concept’s
simple relation to itself in its Übergreifen of reality is to be found precisely in the
way that, of itself, it opens itself up (selectively) to the influence of reality and
therefore stands under the requirement of corresponding to reality. Since even
the way that reality is open to the influence of the concept is to be understood in
conceptual terms, there is an asymmetry between the two terms. As we will see in
the next section, for Hegel this follows from the way that the basic conceptual
terms — universal, individual, particular — are each capable of mediating each
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other in a way that objective conceptions of relation (particularly force and
causation) are incapable.
If the interpretation offered here is correct, then it is a misunderstanding of
Hegel’s conception of the relation between concept and reality to assume a fixed
goal, as Theunissen does. Furthermore, since for Hegel, the necessity of the
change of the end derives precisely from the immanence of the goal in the means
(i.e., from their equality or non-dialectical correspondence), there is no reason to
think that such a change ceases to be important in the transition, through internal
teleology, to the idea. Quite the contrary, the more thoroughly the end becomes
immanent in the means, the more necessary its transformation becomes. This is
what is going on in Hegel’s discussion of theoretical cognition and practical
willing as shapes of the idea, where the former takes reality as what is genuine
and fills abstract subjectivity with it (and thus allows reality to determine its
content), and the latter takes subjectivity as what is genuine and modifies
objectivity in accordance with it (EL§225). Furthermore true necessity is the
threshold of willing, since such necessity (the goal even of theoretical cognition)
can be grounded only in the valorization of subjectivity as constitutive of its
relation to objectivity, and yet even in willing that necessity presents itself as only
partial with respect to the claims of objectivity, i.e., as a mere ought whose
resolution requires a return to the presupposition of theoretical cognition that
objectivity is truth (EL§234 & Z).
Hegel’s construction of goal-directedness thus has a therapeutic function,
which is that it shows the fixed-end conception of purposiveness to be a
mistaken overgeneralization from what is in fact a limit case: very simple
instances of intentional purposiveness in which technique (means) and goal are
given as the result of past development and simply applied in combination.
This is to charge Theunissen with the familiar Hegelian misdemeanor of
artificially separating the result from the process of its achievement, only
here that separation is made more tempting by the fact that the result itself is a
process — only a more local one — so the abstraction more easily goes
unnoticed.7 But note that the kind of therapy here is more Aristotelian
than Wittgensteinian, in that it addresses not a confusion brought on by
misunderstanding of how words are used but rather an overgeneralization of a
partial truth. In this respect, it is rather like Aristotle’s attempt to prevent us from
overgeneralizing the partial truth that pleasure is a good into the false view that
pleasure is the good, where an integral part of that attempt is a constructive account
of pleasure as itself a byproduct (or ‘consequent end’) of successful action.8
But teleology is just one articulation of the power of the concept, and
perhaps a somewhat derivative articulation at that given its specific placement as
a model of objectivity within the subjective logic. Thus one might think that this
first Hegelian response misses Theunissen’s point, which is really about the
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power of the concept as such. Theunissen is well aware of Hegel’s claimed
superiority of the conceptual terms as compared to the objective forms of
relation, but in ‘Krise der Macht’ he has argued with great care that on Hegelian
terms power can only be understood as the domination of the whole over
the other.
II
There, Theunissen argues that Übergreifen develops already in the logic of
reflection as the appropriation of the one of the other as its other. Hegel’s
specifically dialectical thinking of this power requires the overcoming of
alterity and thus a repression of difference that thus constitutes identity as the
whole which dominates the other.9 When this power is then thematized by
the doctrine of the concept, it can be nothing but the management of the
suppression of the other, since self and other are related as two totalities, each of
which must appropriate the other in order to maintain its own existence.10 As
Theunissen’s charge of domination makes clear, here we are focusing on the
dangers of the effectiveness of control that is the second aspect of power
discussed above. A reply to Theunissen must take up the distinctive way that the
elements of the concept are related to each other as opposed to their proximate
analogues in the logic of essence, and most importantly the way that the
effectiveness of conceptual individuality is taken to be different from the activity
of essential necessity.
This latter topic is important because though Theunissen focuses his
criticism on identity, difference, and contradiction, the theory of productivity that
begins in the discussion of the determinations of reflection is continually
developed in the course of the Doctrine of Essence, and the proximate source of
the power of the concept is to be found later on, in the interpretation of necessity
as activity. In the Encyclopedia Logic this interpretation is summarized in clear but
condensed form in §148 as the connection between three elements: fact (Sache),
condition (Bedingung), and activity (Tätigkeit). Very briefly, the activity expresses
the fact in a determinate fashion under certain conditions. More technically (and
using the vocabulary of modality in which it is embedded), the fact is posited as
something inner and possible by reference to the external, existing condition, and
in this positing it is presupposed that it has its own proper content that is
expressed in existence through the utilization of the resources presented by the
conditions. The conditions are those actual features that are posited by the fact in
such a way that their independence is presupposed. And activity both posits and
presupposes its own conditions (the condition and the fact); it is the necessity of
separating the two that is presupposed by the fact.11
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The schema developed in §148 has extensive consequences for the Doctrine
of the Concept.12 This is made clear by the way that in the closing of the
Doctrine of Essence in the greater Logic, Hegel introduces the elements of the
concept as better understood forms of the elements of active necessity. As always
in Hegel, proper conceptualization is a transformation of what is conceptualized,
and Hegel marks the change by emphasizing the way in which each of the three
elements shows itself to be the whole only by ‘negative self-reference’ to the other
two (WL 11, 409) and thus that freedom is the ‘mode of relation of the concept
(Verhältnisweise des Begriffs)’ (WL 12, 12). To paraphrase this negative
self-reference we might talk of the way in which each opens itself to the others or
determines itself to accept the influence of the others; or in Hegelian terms to be
a semblance (Schein) of the other; or we might say using Theunissen’s language, to
stand under the claim of the other; or with McDowell, to be ‘rationally
vulnerable’ to the other.13
To come to the specific introduction of the conceptual elements (WL 11,
409), the fact (Sache) becomes the universal: ‘the totality (hitherto passive
substance) which is originative as reflection out of the internal determinateness,
as a simple whole, which contains within itself its positedness and is posited as
self-identical therein.’14 Here the emphasis is clearly on containment (‘das sein
Gesetztsein in sich enthält’), which also comes out in Hegel’s characterizations of
universality in terms of the simplicity and purity of its self-reference (e.g., WL
12,33). This looks to be grist for Theunissen’s mill, since such purity is easily
understood in terms of the overcoming of alterity. And, in fact, universality
marks that openness to influence that is secured by the capacity to undermine the
significance of that influence by exceeding its limited context.15 For example, this
is the openness of an algebraic expression to the influence of different values of
its variables, or the openness of property rights claims to different events
affecting the underlying possession. Here there is a vulnerability of indifference,
but only when that German term — Gleichgültigkeit — is understood also
positively as ‘equal validity’. It is from this perspective that Hegel characterizes
the universal as a free and non-violent power (WL 12, 35), and with respect to
this specific conceptual function in isolation it seems right for Theunissen
to understand it on analogy with a defective model of the love of God according
to which God merely condescends to take up our facticity rather than engaging in
a truly mutual or intersubjective love.16 But Hegel tries to show that the function
cannot be taken in isolation, or rather, that precisely by taking the function in
isolation we see it as one particular function among others. Thus Hegel argues
that in virtue of having the internal norm (Maßstab) by which it is able to take
up that particularity, the universal is itself a particular (WL 12, 32). This is
Hegel’s way of indicating that even the indifference of the universal is a kind of
vulnerability, as comes out in his claim that the universal and the particular are
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mutually produced out of a double seeming (Doppelschein), outwards into the
particular and inwards into the universal at the same time (WL 12, 35).
To move on with the introduction of the conceptual elements, the condition
becomes the particular (WL 11, 409): ‘because the universal is self-identical only
in that it contains the determinateness within itself as superseded, and is thus the
negative as negative, it is immediately the same identity which individuality is. And
the individuality, because it equally is the determinately determined, the negative
as negative, immediately is the same identity that universality is. This their simple
identity is particularity.’ But we must be careful about the simplicity here.
Paradoxically, particularity is the simple identity of universality and particularity
(i.e., the negative as negative), but is not, as it were, the simple identity of itself
(precisely because it is the identity of negativity). What we have then in the
particular as the outward half of this double seeming is non-simple but also not a
whole: ‘The particularity is not therefore as totality’ (WL 12, 40). For this reason
particularity is both that which binds together the universal and the individual but
also a limit notion of reason. It is the cement of Hegel’s conceptual universe but
precisely by having the double openness to its significance being exceeded by the
universal and modified by individual contrasts with other particulars. But Hegel’s
view appears to be that there is a kind of power precisely in this double
vulnerability. Precisely because of its vulnerability to individual contrast it has the
ability of modify the significance of the larger context in the process of being
exceeded by it. And precisely because of its vulnerability to being exceeded by the
larger context it brings its own distinctive content to its contrasts with other
particulars, unlike, for example, structure of Dasein. Of the former ability
examples are the changes in the slope of a graph of a function on the basis of
new values, or changes in bodily capacities as a result of specific challenges in
athletic training. Examples of the latter would be the way, on Hegel’s view, the
upbringing within the family prepares men for the competition of civil society.
In the greater Logic, after introduction of the particular, Hegel circles back
around to the universal to re-characterize its exceeding function now that this
function is no longer to be taken in isolation, and he does so by way of a form/
content contrast between the universal and particular.17 He tells the following
story: at first it looks as if the universal is entirely unaltered by its uptake of the
particular — this is what he calls ‘pure universality.’ But this very indeterminacy
makes the universal a kind of particular — it makes it a genus, and this
determinate character is what allows it to vacuum up the particulars indifferently,
but really only to vacuum up a certain range of particulars. To put it in the terms
I have used, the exceeding function of universality turns out to be grounded in
its identity with the particular (WL 12, 38). But, therapeutically, this reveals that
what looked like pure universality is in fact just abstract universality, where the
adjective ‘abstract’ denotes precisely the way in which the universal stands under
Christopher Yeomans
41
the claim of particular content on pain of being defective qua universal (WL 12,
41). This is what explains Hegel’s claims that the particular has turned the tables
here, and is itself ‘indifferent’ with respect to the universal (i.e., different
universals are with equal validity ascribed to it) (WL 12, 40), and thus that the
constitution of the universal as the inner half of the double seeming necessarily
goes beyond indifference to the outer particular (WL 12, 36).
A great example of this movement of recognition that the pure universal is
in fact an abstract universal comes from French revolutionary debates about the
scope of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. An initial, apparently
purely universal ascription of rights to all men is then revealed to be implicitly
qualified by particular features, and then the question is which particular
features matter qua universal, i.e., as the norm for inclusion of the particulars by
exceeding their limited context. Was the pure universal ‘man’ qua rights-bearer to
be construed as fundamentally a property holder, i.e., ‘property-holder’ is the
particular that matters qua universal, which specifies the rule by which the
particulars are measured and which thus turns ‘man’ into an abstract universal or
genus (in which case perhaps free mixed-race residents of the French colonies
were to be made full citizens and to have their own property rights to their slaves
confirmed). Or, on the other hand, should the universal ‘man’ be construed in
terms of the norm of conscience and its internal connection to liberty (as in
arguments for the abolition of slavery). But this example also shows that we
should resist the temptation to think of the pure universal simply as a mistake, a
false mental product. The pure universal form of ‘man’ obviously had
extraordinary real effects in the revolutionary period, and the significance of
specifying its more determinate (paradoxically — ‘abstract’) form depend
precisely on the power that it had qua pure (i.e., it would not have had that power
had it been antecedently specified). Similar points could be made about the
revolutionary debates about the rights of women and Jews. In fact, the internal
connection between the pure and the abstract universal is exemplified
perspicuously in the curious rhetoric of the 1791 proclamations of the French
National Assembly confirming rights of the Jews:
The National Assembly, considering that the conditions
necessary to be a French citizen and to become an active citizen
are fixed by the Constitution, and that every man meeting the
said conditions, who swears the civic oath, and engages himself
to fulfill all the duties that the Constitution imposes, has the right
to all of the advantages that the Constitution insures;
Revokes all adjournments, reservations, and exceptions inserted
into the preceding decrees relative to Jewish individuals who will
swear the civic oath which will be regarded as a renunciation of
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all the privileges and exceptions introduced previously in their
favor.18
The proclamation has the form of merely clarifying what the Constitution itself
already meant, removing exceptions to its universality that has the double effect
of making the universal itself more abstract while making its scope more
concrete.
This is that double seeming, inward into the universal and outward into the
particular, which is clearly the analogue of activity as we saw in in EL§148 from
the Doctrine of Essence that itself differentiates between the possible fact and
the actual conditions, but in the concept, activity becomes the individual: ‘the
totality (hitherto causal substance) into the reflection, equally out of internal
determinateness into a negative determinateness which, as thus the self-identical
determinateness is likewise posited as the whole, but as self-identical negativity.’What is
interesting about the greater Logic’s discussions is the contrast between the
treatment at the end of the Doctrine of Essence (in which particularity is
introduced last as the identity of universality and individuality) and the treatment
in the first chapter of the Doctrine of the Concept, in which Hegel treats
individuality as just falling out of the re-contextualization of the exceeding
function of the universal by the influence of the particular (WL 12, 49). This is a
superficial difference, of course, but a difference that allows Hegel to emphasize
different aspects of individuality in the two discussions. In the first its
vulnerability is emphasized, and in the second its effectiveness. But since what we
are primarily interested in is the connection between the two, we need to do
justice to both. The vulnerability introduced in the first discussion is
fundamentally the vulnerability of contrasts between different ways of playing
a functional role.19 So, for example, this is the vulnerability of normal cell DNA
to retrovirus DNA, or the vulnerability of a spouse to being replaced by another
lover. In the second discussion the emphasis on effectiveness tries to get at the
way that this vulnerability is essential to the power of the concept in virtue of that
power being exercised as a part of a project that can fail, a project that involves
bringing the differences between the particulars back to a unity that is opposed to
the abstract universal and is in accord with their own nature (WL 12, 42).20 So, to
take the cellular example, a unity that was abstract would be precisely indifferent
between the normal DNA and retrovirus DNA and thus would undermine the
cell’s project of maintaining itself. What the cell needs is a unity that excludes
the retrovirus DNA, but this can only come from leveraging the nature of the
particular elements of the cell in their interconnection. So one might interpret the
advances in HIV treatment due to the use of multiple anti-retroviral drugs that
target the substitution of normal for retroviral DNA at multiple points as an
example of assistance in the project of bodily individuality in that instance in
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which the body’s own system for discriminating the universal nature of its
particulars (the immune system) has become part of the problem. What is
important here from the second discussion in the Doctrine of the Concept is the
way that the abstract universal plays a role as a kind of particular with respect to
the project of individual effectiveness, as an inherent danger and therefore also as
a limit notion of reason (WL 12, 49). Though there is no time to explore the
point here, Hegel also suggests that the individual is in some sense a limit notion
of reason as well: ‘Individuality is not, however, only the turning back of the
concept into itself, but the immediate loss of it’ (WL 12, 51). Thus all three of
the conceptual elements are, when taken in isolation, limit notions of reason.
That is, they name intra-conceptual deficiencies of comprehensibility such as can
only be made good by radical supplementation by the other two deficiencies. To
use a visual metaphor, they each name distortions of perspective that can only be
corrected by reference to the distortions of the other two perspectives rather than
by any undistorted perspective.
This returns us to the question of the relation of the therapeutic and
constructive. As a first pass at a therapeutic diagnosis, we can say again that
Theunissen has overgeneralized one aspect of the role of one of the three elements
(the exceeding function of the universal). More broadly, what this constructive
account reveals, in the therapeutic language, is the possibility of three different
kinds of pathologies of effectiveness, each a result of overgeneralizing one of the
three perspectives into the sole general perspective on their interrelation: when
exclusively universal, the kind of existential battle for supremacy Theunissen sees
(or, more abstractly and without the communications-theoretical rhetoric, the
difficulty of qualitative theories of individuation to account for differences between
concrete particulars); when purely particular, the kind of passivity in film noir
characters21 and Humean moral psychology (or, more abstractly, the fist-pounding
character of bare particular accounts of individuation); and when purely individual,
vanity (or, more abstractly, insistence on something like Leibniz’s Principle of the
Identity of Indiscernibles).22 But perhaps a better Hegelian therapeutic diagnosis of
Theunissen’s view is syncretism. His initially quite plausible claim — i.e., that self
and other are related as two totalities, each of which must appropriate the other in
order to maintain its own existence — illegitimately combines the exceeding
operation of the abstract universal with the competitive stakes of the possible
substitution of individuals. But this therapeutic point is secured via the constructive
account of the triple perspectives, and specifically via an alternate account of the
identity of the universal and the individual, which just is his notion of particularity.
None of the three conceptual elements is reducible to the other even as a matter of the
perspective on the relation between the three; thus Hegel’s idea that each of the three ‘is just
as much the whole concept as it is determinate concept and a determination of the
concept’ (WL 12, 32).
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The key notion here is the way that totality is being reinterpreted.
Theunissen’s assumption that such totality requires the overcoming of alterity
entails the existential struggle for comprehensive control. But in Hegel, the
notion of a totality points not to exhaustiveness of scope but depth of realization.
Such realization is fundamentally contrastive, but it is nonetheless compatible
with (and in fact parasitic on) the alternate forms of realization with which it
contrasts. Further, those alternate forms are always in some sense particular
aspects of the realization of the original form. As Hegel puts it in closing his
discussion of the conceptual elements at the end of the Doctrine of Essence,
‘These three totalities are therefore one and the same reflection that, as negative
self-reference, differentiates itself into the other two totalities’ (WL 11, 409). This
radicalizes the point made in §I because it shows subjectivity to be precisely the
register in which the reciprocal yet asymmetrical priority of the related terms can
be articulated. That is, one can articulate the way that reality (as the particular)
and the concept (as the universal) each can serve as the fundamental perspective
with respect to which the other is its articulation only by using the subjective-
conceptual categorization of universal, particular, individual rather than the
objective-causal categorization of action and reaction.
To use terms that Robert Hanna has employed in the debates about
conceptualism, the characterization of the particular as a limit notion of reason
affirms the Kantian gap between general concepts and manifold intuitions,
though now reinterpreted as an intra-conceptual gap rather than a gap between
conceptual and non-conceptual content.23 But it is impossible to see this if it is
not also recognized that the universal is itself a limit notion of reason (and the
individual as well), and this is the point of Hegel’s discussion of the Kantian gap
in the introductory material on the concept (WL 12, 17-23). Otherwise the
universal looks to be paradigmatically the concept and the particular only
derivatively so, and then it looks like Hegel can mind the gap only in a
Pickwickian sense or attempts to eliminate it entirely (this is how Hanna reads
Hegel). But once we recognize that all three conceptual elements are limit notions
of reason, we get a version of conceptualism in Hegel that is both stronger and
weaker than McDowell’s — stronger in the sense that there is no form of
receptivity, but weaker in the sense that the conceptual sphere itself is opened up,
as it were, by essential internal resistance by the manifold of particularity to
generalization.24
To put the point bluntly, the true depth of the claim of reality on subjectivity
can only be given in subjective terms, which is again a way of putting the rejection
of the Myth of the Given. And yet Hegel wants to push beyond this bare
rejection to try to articulate, within the subjective register, precisely what
differentiates the kinds of claims that reality makes on subjectivity from the kinds
of claims that subjectivity makes on reality, and both of these from the kinds of
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claims that individual manifestation makes on both subjectivity and reality. The
conceptual may be unbounded, but its internal topography is in fact a geography
of diverse and diversely connected regions. Actually, we can push this metaphor a
bit further by using the mathematical notion of manifolds and maps. When
a three-dimensional space such as a sphere (such as, roughly, the Earth) is
projected onto two-dimensional maps (or charts), a non-Euclidean space is
represented by a Euclidean space. This allows better comprehension of the
topological characteristics of the space but at the cost of some distortion. What
topologists call the maximal atlas is the collection of such map projections
(charts) and the additional transition map that allows points on one map to be
transformed into points on the other map, and this atlas defines a non-Euclidean
manifold in Euclidean terms. In Hegel, the universality, particularity and
individuality of any object (Sache) are like the different map projections of the
atlas: moderately distorted yet truth-revealing. But two natural tendencies must
be resisted: on the one hand, the tendency to think that there is some further,
single perspective from which every point immediately appears in undistorted
relation to every other point; and on the other hand, the tendency to think that
the ineliminability of distortion entails that we can have no firm grasp of truth
and must therefore lapse into skeptical anti-realism or a Heideggerian mysticism
of unconcealment. With regard to the first tendency, the utility of two-
dimensional projections nicely makes the point at issue because in a three-
dimensional presentation the back side of the figure is always hidden. With regard
to the second, the figures of the judgment and syllogism are like the transition
maps that allow one to move from one distorted presentation to the other, and
thus the modes of inference provide principled routes for supplementing
manifestations distorted in one way by manifestations distorted in another. The
most important claim here is Hegel’s idea that the modes of distorted
presentation are relatively few in number (three), and thus that the complexity of
the transition map between them is manageable — and in fact we have a long
(though self-misunderstood) tradition of logic devoted precisely to this transition
problem. Universality, particularity and individuality are thus modes of veridical
manifestation and ipso facto modes of distortion, but the maximal atlas of
their presentations and the system of transitions between them (i.e., the idea)
defines the manifold in such a way that every truth can manifest itself in some
connection or other.
Conclusion
I have said rather too little in this paper about the problem of control in the logic
of essence, and rather too much elsewhere, so let me say something of the right
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length at least about the relation between Hegel’s treatment of the theme in the
logics of essence and the concept. On my view, there are two different sets of
problems that arise for the notion of control, regardless of whether the locus of
responsibility with respect to which control is defined is an agent’s will or some
other conceptual structure. The first set concerns the very possibility of that
locus of responsibility, and with respect to agents this set is represented in
modern, broadly naturalistic skepticism about free will. Hegel attempts to deal
with these concerns as issues not of nature but of explicability generally in his
treatment of objectivity, both in the logic of essence and in the conception of
the object within the logic of the concept. The second set of problems concerns
the question of whether multiple loci of responsibility are possible, i.e., whether
my being such a locus of responsibility is compatible with your being such a locus
(or God, or the state).25 This set is represented by a broad sweep of writers that
I think of as particularist critics of Hegel.26 But as should be clear from the
orientation of this paper, I take Theunissen to be the most sophisticated and
insightful purveyor of such objections. Hegel takes up these concerns in the
Logic’s account of subjectivity and its relation to objectivity.
In my view, both sets of concerns are legitimate, neither confusions nor
pseudo-problems. And both of Hegel’s sets of responses add to the complete
understanding of control, i.e., in a technical sense, the idea of control. So though
Hegel’s constructive accounts do have the therapeutic function of showing
certain expectations to be mistaken, they also show that there is some truth to
those expectations, and thus that they are not pure Schein in Theunissen’s sense of
a phenomenon that does not participate in truth at all.
Let me conclude on this note by taking up Michael Quante’s framing of
the issue of Hegelian therapy by way of distinctions between therapeutic
and constructive philosophy of a variety of different forms.27 In its narrowest
sense, the conception of philosophy as therapeutic holds that the only task of
philosophy consists in curing misunderstandings that are engendered by
philosophical mistakes. In a wider sense, one might think of philosophy as
therapeutic if its task extends to the convictions of non-philosophical domains
when those convictions cause suffering in those who hold them. So this sense
differs from the narrow sense in holding both that there are problems that are
not ultimately rooted in philosophical misunderstanding but that these problems
are nonetheless treatable by philosophical means. On either interpretation,
therapeutic self-understanding orients philosophy practically by understanding its
function as one of enabling the good life. In contrast, constructive philosophy
aims to solve problems. In the pejorative sense, such a procedure actually creates
the problems that necessitate therapy by mistaking philosophical problems for
real problems. But Quante thinks that there is also a sense of constructive
philosophy — which he calls its narrow sense — in which it attempts to
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construct solutions for real problems within common sense (whether explicit or
implicit) that endanger the good life, and so may be correspond to or at least be
an element of therapeutic philosophy in the wider sense. Then there is a related
but wider sense of constructive philosophy that goes further in wanting to
provide a philosophical framework to support the assumptions of common
sense, even when those assumptions are not causing any proximate trouble.
Finally, there is a revisionary sense of constructive philosophy that attempts to
replace common sense, which it takes to be fundamentally mistaken.
With respect to Hegel’s systematic philosophy as a whole, Quante thinks
that one might be able to defend Hegel from the charge that his thinking is
constructive in the objectionable, revisionary sense if one could show both
that he actually preserves rather than re-interprets the central assumptions of
common sense and that his own systematic philosophical assumptions are
necessary for that preservation.28 If he could do so, Quante thinks, he could
supersede the distinction between the narrow sense of constructive philosophy
(according to which philosophy limits itself to constructing solutions for real
problems within common sense) and its wider sense (according to which it builds
a philosophical framework for those solutions) and in so doing show that the
therapeutic project required constructive philosophy. Quante thinks there are
three reasons why Hegel cannot successfully make this double move in the case
of his philosophy as a whole; let me conclude by saying at least why these three
reasons are not true of his treatment of control.
First, Quante argues that Hegel’s taking skepticism seriously (with its
requirement for a firm foundation) involves responding to an assumption that is
decidedly not a part of common sense. But I think that the basic conception that
drives Theunissen’s criticisms — that power requires a fixed goal to which all
other conditions are subjected as powerless — is widely shared and initially quite
plausible, and in fact serves as the common-sense element that motivates
particularist critical interpretations of Hegel.
Second, Quante argues that Hegel has produced an implausibly internalist
conception of self-consciousness. But if the interpretation of the elements of the
concept offered in §II is correct, then this is simply not the case. And since
the Doctrine of the Concept is, officially at least, the theory of subjectivity of
such, the role of particularity there shows the externalist component even in the
categorical scheme as it is neutral between theoretical and practical ideas. This is,
of course, an internal externalism, as it were — i.e., the externality is between the
universal and the particular— but Hegel nonetheless thinks this incorporates the
contingency that an implausibly internalist conception does not.
Third, Quante argues that Hegel also does not succeed in showing that qua
finite subjects we implicitly make these commitments, and thus showing that his
philosophy is a reconstruction rather than a replacement of common sense
Power as Control and the Therapeutic Effects of Hegel’s Logic
48
commitments. But here I think the ease with which we can understand examples
of power that include Hegel’s commitments shows their presence within the
common stock of possible thoughts that goes by the name ‘common sense.’
Common sense is not so common not because people are dumb, but because it is
a shifting and only moderately consistent set of commitments, so this case in
which both the commitment that produces skepticism and the commitment that
answers it are present in common sense is by no means exceptional; in a
Gadamerian register we might rather speak of this aspect of Hegel’s therapeutic
effect as the revealing and investigating of prejudices.
Now, I don’t deny that there may be Hegelian arguments that have a more
narrowly therapeutic form — for example, the striking unimportance of the notion
of virtue in his moral philosophy is to be explained at least in part by his diagnosis
of a confusion between the Greek arête, the Latin virtus, and the German Tugend —
but whatever therapeutic effects his discussion of control produces are intertwined






‘Begriff Und Realität: Hegels Aufhebung Des Metaphysischen Wahrheitsbegriffs.’
2 See also Theunissen, Sein und Schein, 320–3. Thus we could also put the issue
epistemologically, or as one between subjective and objective concepts, but I think that
Theunissen is right to see that for Hegel, at least, these ways of framing the question involve
more basic logical or metaphysical relations that are the root of the problem. This isn’t to say
that all epistemological issues are resolved once the logical relations are clarified, but only that
the latter can be addressed relatively independently of the former and that doing so can help
down the line with more specifically epistemic (or normative) problems. This is consistent with
the fact that on other issues it might be the case that epistemic or normative problems could
be addressed relatively independently of logical or metaphysical ones, and that the former
could help down the line with the latter. With respect to some epistemic issues vis-à-vis logical
ones, particularly the epistemic separation between subject and object and the logical relation
between internality and externality, this state of affairs is embodied in the relation of the
Phenomenology to the Logic.
3 On this point, see Robert Wallace’s brief discussion of Theunissen’s similar claim in Sein und
Schein that infinity ceases to become a goal in becoming a process (Hegel’s Philosophy of Reality,




‘Evaluating Social Reasons: Hobbes Versus Hegel’, 340.
5 McDowell, Mind and World. Of course, the idea that Hegel is engaged with the elimination of
givenness is central to Theunissen’s interpretation of the Logic. See Theunissen, Sein und Schein,
336–337.
6 Pippin, ‘McDowell’s Germans: Response to ‘On Pippin’s Postscript’, 413.
7 See EL§215: ‘The idea is essentially process, because its identity is only the absolute and free
identity of the concept, because this identity is the absolute negativity and hence dialectical.’
8 See NE x.4 and 7.
9
‘Krise Der Macht. Thesen Zur Theorie Des Dialektischen Wahrheitsbegriffs’.
10 There is a second version of this in Theunissen, Sein und Schein, 42-44. Though Hegel says
that love is essential to the concept, his model of love is just God condescending to take up
our facticity rather than a truly mutual or intersubjective love. In contrast, in communicative
freedom one experiences the other as a condition of possibility of one’s own self-actualization.
Though Hegel criticizes metaphysics in the objective logic from the perspective of
communicative freedom, his own overemphasis of lordship in Christianity eliminates the
possibility of any intersubjective theory of freedom. As a result one gets a criticism of ontology
in the objective logic, but a non-critical special metaphysics in the doctrine of the concept.
11 This is necessarily a very short presentation of these complex ideas. For a fuller discussion
see Yeomans, Freedom and Reflection, §10.2.
12 In fact, the earlier point about the mutability of the end depends on the EL§148 discussion
of productivity in arguing that the end qua inner guiding element is constructed out of the
activity of its realization (WL 12, 161-2). Though I cannot enter further into discussion here,
there are interesting questions about the relation between substance (object) and subject, on
the one hand, and this schema centered around the Sache, on the other. On this general point I
am sympathetic to the view developed in Bowman, Hegel and the Metaphysics of Absolute
Negativity, chap. 6.
13 McDowell, Mind and World, 139. For a concise summary of the importance of this
reciprocal rational vulnerability for Hegel’s solution to the problem of individuation see Stern,
Hegelian Metaphysics, 354–358.
14 See also WL 12, 12, where the universal is characterized as relating to the passive substance
powerless to posit itself.
15 Thus the characterizations of the universal as ‘negation of determinateness’ (WL 12, 16) and the
claim that ‘the determinateness that it holds within is superseded’ (WL 11, 409).
16 Theunissen, Sein und Schein, 42–4.
17 Cf. Hegel’s characterization at WL 12, 50: ‘It follows that each of the determinations
established in the preceding exposition of the concept has immediately dissolved itself and has
lost itself in its other. Each distinction is confounded in the course of the very reflection that
should isolate it and hold it fixed. Only a way of thinking that is merely representational, for which
abstraction has isolated them, is capable of holding the universal, the particular, and the
singular rigidly apart.’
18 See Hunt, The French Revolution and Human Rights, 101.
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19 See WL 12, 51: ‘The individual…exists for itself…In accordance with this qualitative
character, it is, first, the repulsion of itself from itself by virtue of which many other ones are
presupposed; second, it is now a negative reference with respect to these presupposed others, and
to this extent the individual is exclusive.’
20 Of course, this is connected to the concreteness of the concept. See Schick, Hegels
Wissenschaft der Logik, 19.
21 See Pippin, Fatalism in American Film Noir.
22 For the points about individuation see Stern, Hegelian Metaphysics, chap. 12 and Southgate,
‘Hegel and the Identity of Indiscernibles.’
23 See Hanna, ‘Kant, Hegel, and the Fate of Non-Conceptual Content.’ A way of seeing the
sense in which Hegel maintains the gap in Hanna’s terms is to notice that if we paraphrase his
formula for the status of essentially rogue objects (i.e., objects that essentially resist
conceptualization) in terms of universals rather than concepts, then Hegel does hold that
there is an essential insufficiency of universals alone: that a rogue object ‘cannot be uniquely
individuated by empirical concepts and/or schematized pure concepts’ (19) becomes ‘cannot be
uniquely individuated by universals.’ My interpretation on this point is fundamentally in accord
with Bowman, Hegel and the Metaphysics of Absolute Negativity. Though superficially at odds, I
believe it is also consistent with the account in Ch. 12 (if not Ch. 9) of Stern, Hegelian Metaphysics.
24 In this regard particularity answers the call of Perician Secondness — see Stern, Hegelian
Metaphysics, chap. 9.
25 This is related to the distinction made by Robert Pippin with respect to the fatalism of film
noir, namely that between the possibility of action as such, and the effectiveness of action (see
Pippin, Fatalism in American Film Noir, 20).
26 For a good discussion of this brand of criticism as focused on the problem of individuation
and culminating in Deleuze, see Stern, Hegelian Metaphysics, chap. 12. In general, I believe that
the kinds of arguments marshaled in this essay show that particularist criticisms of Hegel by
figures such as Deleuze can be answered at the object level without appeal to metalogical or
metatheoretical standpoints. In this respect my approach is more similar to Stern than
Zambrana, ‘Hegel’s Logic of Finitude.’
27
‘Spekulative Philosophie Als Therapie?’, sec. 2.
28 Quante, ‘Spekulative Philosophie Als Therapie?’, sec. 4.
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